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Title IX: Sex Discrimination in Public 
Elementary and Secondary Schools 
by Jean M. Cary 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 grew 
out of two of the most profound movements for social 
change in this century-the civil rights movement and the 
women's movement. Encouraged by the legislative and 
judicial changes achieved during the civil rights move-
ment, women began to focus their energies on the elimi-
nation of sex discrimination. FlUstrated with limited job 
oppOltunities and discrepancies in salaries between men 
and women, one place women hoped for legislative 
change was in the educational arena.! 
Congress responded to this political pressure by en-
acting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 
Patterned after Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 
Title IX states, "No person in the United States shall on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance."3 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act is 
a more inclusive statute that prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in any 
program receiving federal financial assistance. Title IX 
prohibits only sex discrimination, and it applies only to 
educational institutions that receive federal financial as-
sistance. This mticle examines some aspects of Title IX 
that are relevant to public elementm-y and secondary 
schools. 
The author will be a visiting professor at Campbell University School 
of Law starting in August, 1991. She was a research associate at the Insti-
tute of Government from 1989 to 1990. 
1. Carolyn Ellis Staton, "Sex Discrimination in Public Education," 
Mississippi Law f ournal 58 (Fall 1988): 323; and R. Salomone, Equal Edu-
cation under Law, 113- 14 (New York: SI. Martin's Press, 1986). 
2. 42 U.S.c. § 2000(d) (1982). Section 2000(d) prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of race in federally ass isted programs. 
3.20 U.S .C. § 1681 (1976). 
Who Is Covered by Title IX 
When Title IX was first enacted, a major question 
was whether Title IX applied when an institution received 
only indirect federal assistance. In 1977 Grove City Col-
lege, a private coeducational institution, refused to sign an 
assurance that it would comply with Title IX. Grove City 
claimed that as a private institution it did not receive di-
rect federal assistance and therefore was not obligated to 
- abide by Title IX. The United States Department of Edu-
cation claimed that Grove City College received indirect 
federal assistance when it accepted Basic Educational Op-
portunity Grants (BEOGs) as tuition payments from 
needy students. The Department of Education initiated 
proceedings to declare the college and its students ineli-
gible for BEOGs unless the college agreed to comply with 
Title IX. Grove City and four of its students then sued the 
Depmtment of Education. In the 1984 case Grove City 
College v. Bell,4 the United States Supreme COUlt ruled 
that Title IX applied to all fonns of federal aid to educa-
tion, whether direct or indirect. Therefore Grove City had 
to agree to comply with Title IX or lose any students who 
wished to use BEOGs for tuition payments. 
A second question that arose after the enactment of 
Title IX was whether it applied to only the depmtment or 
pmt of the institution that received federal funds , or if one 
department's receipt of federal money obligated the en-
tire institution to comply with Title IX. When this ques-
tion arose in Grove City, the Supreme Court concluded 
that Title IX applied to only the pmt of the institution that 
received federal education funds and not to the institution 
as a whole. Grove City College had argued that if the 
4.465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
( 
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Comt found that the receipt of BEOGs did constitute fed-
eral assistance, only the financial aid office of the college 
should be obligated to comply with Title IX. The United 
States Supreme Court agreed.s 
Grove City also had a major impact on three other 
civil rights statutes that were worded in the same matmer 
as Title IX.6 Congress reacted to the Supreme Court's de-
cision by amending the four statutes7 to make clear that 
if any part of a system receives federal financial assis-
tance, then the entire system must abide by the statute: 
[The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987] will re-
store the broad, institution-wide application which char-
acterized coverage and enforcement from the time of 
initial passage until the Grove City decision . .. . The 
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 amends each of the 
affected statutes by adding a section defining the plu'ase 
"program or activity" and "program" to make clear that 
discrimination is prohibited throughout entire agencies or 
institutions if any part receives Federal financial assist-
ance .... For education institutions, the bill provides that 
where federal aid is extended anywhere within a college, 
university , or public system of higher education, the en-
tire institution is covered. If federal aid is extended any-
where in an elementary or secondary school system, the 
entire system is covered.R 
By amending the statute, Congress ovelTuled the part 
of Grove City limiting the application of Title IX to the 
department receiving federal assistance. It is now cleat· 
that Title IX requires an entire institution or education -
system to prohibit sex disClimination if any patt of the in-
stitution or system receives federal assistance.9 Because 
all school administrative units in NOlth Cat'olina receive 
some fonn of federal assistance, Title IX applies to all 
North Cat'olina public elementat'y and secondary schools. 
In fact, it applies to every public school in the country. 
5.ld. 
6. The three other statutes were Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,42 U.S.c. § 2000(d) (1982); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S .C. § 794 (1990); and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 296 
U.S.c. § 621 ( 1985). 
7. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 
Stat. 28 (1988) . 
8. 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS, vol. 3, Legislative His· 
tory of the Civil Righls Resloralion Acl of 1987, p. 6. 
9. Title IX requires that every application for federal financial assist-
ance for any education program or activity contain or be accompan ied by an 
assurance from the applicant or recipient that each education program or ac-
tivity operated by the applicant or recipient will be operated in compliance 
with Title IX. Each recipient, or local educational agency [LEA as defined 
by Section 80 I (I) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965] , 
is required to designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to com-
ply with and carry out its responsibilities under Title IX. 34 C.P.R. §§ 106.8, 
106.2 (1989). 
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How Title IX Is Enforced 
There are two methods of enforcing Title IX: termi-
nation of federal funding or an individual private right of 
action. The statute speaks only of the termination of fed-
eral funds. to The United States Supreme Court created the 
second remedy when it allowed aggrieved individuals to 
file their own lawsuits against institutions that are alleg-
edly violating Title IX. II 
Termination of Federal Funding 
The Depattment of Education (and any other federal 
department or agency that is empowered to extend fed-
eral financial assistance to any education progratn or ac-
tivity) issues regulations or orders defining compliance 
with Title IX. The department's Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR) investigates complaints of violations of Title IX. 
In addition OCR conducts compliance reviews to deter-
mine that recipients of federal education funds are com-
plying with Title IX.'2 If Title IX or its regulations are 
violated, then the Department of Education must wam the 
institution of the violation and give it an opportunity to 
come into compliance. (Most cases are resolved through 
voluntary compliance.) If the institution refuses to com-
ply, then the agency may terminate or refuse to grant fed-
eral financial assistance to the institution. The institution 
is entitled to a hearing on the matter. Before tenninating 
federal funding, the head of the Department of Education 
(or other agency empowered to extend federal education 
funds) is required to file a report of the circumstances and 
grounds for the proposed telmination with the United 
States House of Representatives and Senate committees 
having legislative jurisdiction over the program. The 
telmination of funding cannot occur until thirty days 
after this report has been filed with the House and Senate 
committees. 13 
Federal regulations implementing Title IX provide 
that a person who believes that he or she has been sub-
jected to discrimination prohibited by Title IX must file a 
10.20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976), as amended by Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) . 
II. Cannon V. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
12. According to a press release from Michael Williams, assistant sec-
retary of the Department of Education, entitled "National Enforcement Strat-
egy, Office for Civil Rights" and issued in December, 1990, "The increased 
complaint workload in FY 1990 a llowed OCR to devote only 3 percent of 
its total staff resources to compliance review investigations, compared to 75 
percent of the total staff resources used for complaint investigations and re-
lated activities; e.g., monitoring, complainant appeals and quality review. We 
intend to devote the bulk of any new resources to the compliance rev iew 
program. Reviews of larger institutions will be carried out by teams to ex-
pedite the gathering and analysis of data and the development of the letters 
of findings." 
13. 20 U.S .C. § 1682. 
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written complaint with the Department of Education no 
later than 180 days from the date of the alleged 
discrimination. The Depmtment of Education also has the 
authority to extend the time for filing the complaint. 14 
Once the administrative complaint is filed, OCR must 
then investigate the alleged discrimination. 
Litigation 
The other method of enforcement of Title IX is the 
private cause of action. Although the Title IX statute does 
not mention a private cause of action, the United States 
Supreme COUlt has found that private litigants who allege 
that their Title IX rights have been violated may seek re-
dress through their own lawsuits. IS In approving enforce-
ment through a private cause of action, the COUlt relied 
on the similm'ity between Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and Title IX. Courts had em'lier approved a private 
cause of action under Title VI. 16 The Supreme Court also 
hem'd testimony from the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfm'e (the agency that was then in chm'ge of 
the enforcement of Title IX) that it did not have the re-
sources to enforce Title IX in a substantial number of cir-
cumstances mld it therefore supported a private cause of 
action. The Comt held, "We have no doubt that Congress 
intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those 
available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as 
authorizing an implied plivate cause of action for victims 
of the prohibited discrimination."'? 
Persons pursuing a private cause of action are not 
required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing 
a lawsuit. In other words, such persons are not required 
to ask the Department of Education or any other admin-
istrative body to intervene to protect their rights under 
Title IX before resorting to court action. They may go 
straight to court. IS 
If a student sues a state agency for a violation of Title 
IX, the state cannot defend the lawsuit by claiming that 
14. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (1989). 
15. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
16. lei. at 696 [citing Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 
847,852 (5th CiL), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967)]. 
17. Cannon v. Univers ity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979). In 
this case a woman who was denied admission to two medical schools brought 
a civil rights suit chmging the two schools with sex discrimination under Title 
IX. The schools had denied her admission even though they had admitted 
applicants who were less qualified. The schools had a policy of excluding 
anyone over the age of thirty. The petitioner, who was thirty-nine years of 
age, claimed that the policy of excluding applicants over the age of thirty had 
a discriminatory impact on women because women were more likely to post-
pone their higher education in order to raise a family. The Court's decision 
permitted her to pursue her lawsuit against the two schools. 
18. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708 (1979), 
n.4l: "For these reasons, we are not persuaded that individual suits m'e in-
appropriate in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Because the 
individual complainants cannot assure themselves that the administrative 
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as a governmental agency it is immune from liability. In 
1986 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Remedies Equal-
ization Amendment,' 9 which provides that a state shall not 
be inlmUlle under the Eleventh Amendment of the United 
States Constitution from suit in federal court for a viola-
tion of Title IX. Therefore if a state is sued for a viola-
tion of Title IX, it will be liable to the same extent as any 
other public or private entity. 
Statute of limitations. As mentioned earlier, federal 
regulations implementing Title IX provide a 180-day time 
limit for filing administrative complaints. However, these 
regulations do not contain a statute of limitations for the 
filing of litigation.20 Because litigants do not have to ex-
haust administrative remedies prior to going to comt, they 
may miss the 180-day time limit for filing an administra-
tive complaint and still pursue litigation under Title IX. 
Because there is no statute of limitations provided in 
Title IX, and the United States Supreme Court has not 
defined the appropriate time limit in Title IX cases, courts 
are likely to analogize Title IX to civil rights actions and 
look to the recent United States Supreme COUlt decision 
of Owens v. Okure21 to determine the appropriate statute 
of limitations. In Owens the Court found that the appro-
priate statute of limitations in civil rights actions under 
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code is a 
state's residual or general personal injury statute of limi-
tations. In Owens the plaintiff claimed that he had been 
- beaten by police officers when he was arrested. Twenty-
two months after the incident the plaintiff sued, claiming 
a violation of his civil rights. The defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint clainUng that the deadline for filing 
the action had passed. Defendants argued that the COUlt 
should utilize the state's strict one-yem' statute of limita-
tions for intentional t01tS instead of the broader three-yem' 
general statute of limitations. The Supreme Court ruled 
that when state law provides multiple statutes of limita-
tions for personal injury actions, courts considering Sec-
tion 1983 claims should use the general or residual statute 
for personal injury actions.22 Therefore the Court ruled 
that the case was timely filed under the state's three-year 
statute of limitations. 
Although no courts have yet applied Owens v. Okure 
to Title IX, because Title IX violations are similar to civil 
process will reach a decision on their complaints within a reasonable time, 
it makes little sense to require exhaustion." See also Simpson v. Reynolds 
Metal Co., Inc., 629 F.2d. 1226 (7th CiL 1980); and Rothschild v. 
Grottenthaler, 716 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
19. Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment [codified at 42 
U.S.c. § 2000d-7 (1988)]. 
20. Minor v. Northville Pub. Schools, 605 F. Supp. 1185, 1199-200 
(E.D. Mich. 1985). 
2 1. 488 U.S. 235 (1989). 
22. lei. at 249-50. 
) 
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rights injuries, courts may use the reasoning of that case 
to find that a state ' s general or residual statute of limita-
tions is appropriate.23 The residual statute in North Caro-
lina is three years.24 
Compensatory damages. When the Supreme Court 
decided that litigants have the right to pursue a private 
cause of action against an institution for alleged gender-
based discrimination, the COUlt did not decide if a person 
may be compensated monetarily when she or he is suc-
cessful in such a lawsuit.25 Because the issue of compen-
sation did not arise in the case, the Court authorized only 
declarative and injunctive relief. In other words, a litigant 
could seek a comt order requiring an educational institu-
tion to comply with Title IX. A litigant also could seek 
an order declruiug or defining an institution's action as a 
violation of Title IX. More recently litigants have sought 
monetary compensation as well as declarative and injtillC-
tive relief. 
Cunently there is a conflict in the circuit courts on 
the availability of monetary awards in Title IX cases. 
When the monetru'y compensation issue arose in the Sev-
enth Circuit COUlt of Appeals, the COUlt found that both 
Title IX and its legislative history were silent as to the 
existence of a financial award for sexual discrimination. 
Because the comt found that by accepting federal money, 
an institution could potentially be exposing itself to huge 
financial liability-possibly greater than the federal funds 
received-the court concluded that institutions should -
not be forced to pay damages unless the statute clearly 
informs them of their potential liability. Because Con-
gress did not create an explicit monetary compensation 
remedy, the comt found that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to damages.26 
In a more recent case, Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public Schools, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that because the Supreme Court has not de-
cided whether a litigant can recover compensatory dam-
ages for intentional discrimination under Title IX, each 
circuit court of appeals can decide the issue for itselfY 
In the eleventh circuit case, a female student sued seek-
ing damages for alleged intentional gender-based dis-
crimination against her. She alleged that she and her 
economics teacher had engaged in two or three episodes 
of sexual intercourse on school property . . She stated that 
23. See Minor v. Northville Pub. Schools. 605 F. Supp. [185 (E.D. 
Mich . [985) , for a decision applying this concept to Tit[e IX before Owens 
v. Okure. 
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § [,52(5) (1983). 
25. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
26. Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 11 85 (7th Cir. 
1981). 
27.911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. [990) , petitionjor cert.filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 
3441 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1990) (No. 90,918). 
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the teacher had also authorized her late admittance to 
other classes on several occasions. The student presented 
extensive evidence in court showing that other school 
officials knew of the relationship and did not take appro-
priate action to protect the girl. The eleventh circuit de-
cided that the Supreme Court decision in Guardians 
Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York28 
precluded a cause of action for damages for unintentional 
discrimination but left open the question of drunages for 
intentional discrimination under Title IX. Basing its de-
cision on eru'lier precedent in the circuit, the eleventh cir-
cuit ruled that a student could not recover compensatory 
damages under Title IX even if the student proved inten-
tional discrimination.29 
In another recent case the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that if the litigant proved discriminatory 
intent she could recover compensatory damages under 
Title IX.30 The plaintiff was a member of her high school 
chapter of the National Honor Society (NHS). She was 
dismissed from the NHS when she became pregnant out 
of wedlock. She alleged that the principal and the teach-
ers who composed the faculty council governing the NHS 
chapter had discriminated against her on the basis of sex. 
The third circuit remanded the case to the district court 
with instructions that the court hear the plaintiff's evi-
dence that two years after her dismissal a male member 
of the NHS had not been dismissed after he impregnated 
his girlfriend. He later mruTied his girlfriend just prior to 
the bnth of then' child. The faculty council did not take 
any action against him. The third circuit instructed the 
district COUlt to hear the male student's testnnony and then 
detelmine if the plan1tiff had been discriminated against 
intentionally on the basis of her sex. The third circuit 
found that compensatory damages could be awarded un-
der Title IX if the plaintiff proved discriminatory intent. 
The question of whether a litigant can receive com-
pensatory damages under Title IX if she or he proves that 
the educational institution intentionally discriminated 
against the litigant has not been decided by the Fomth 
Cn'cuit Court of Appeals, which includes North Carolina, 
28. 463 U.S. 584 (1983). In that opinion the United States Supreme 
Court agreed that di scriminatory intent was not a prerequisite to relie.f under 
Title VI, but "at [east five justi ces would not allow compensatory relief to a 
private plaintiff under Title VI absent proof of discriminatory intent." 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617, 620 (I I th Cir. 
1990), [citing Manecke v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, Fla. , 762 F.2d 912, 
922 n.8 (lith Cir. 1985), cat. denied, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986)). The eleventh 
circuit looked to the Supreme Court decision in Guardians because Title IX 
was modeled after Title VI. 
29. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools , 911 F.2d 617, 622 
( II th Cir. 1990) [citing Drayden v. Needville Indep. School Dist. , 642 F.2d 
129 (5th Cir. Unit A, 1981)]. 
30. Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School Dist. , 917 F.2d 779 (3d CiT. 
1990). 
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or the United States Supreme Comt. Plaintiffs in Franklin 
v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the eleventh circuit 
case described above, have filed a petition for certiorari, 
asking the United States Supreme Court to heal' the case. 
The Comt has asked the solicitor general to file a brief in 
the case expressing the views of the United States.31 Be-
cause of the conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court 
may agree to hear the case. Unless there is a decision by 
either the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals or the United 
States Supreme Court finding that damages al'e unavail-
able, North Carolina school authorities should be aware 
that litigants might be able to obtain compensatory dam-
ages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief under 
Title IX, if they prove that school officials have discrimi-
nated intentionally against them. 
Attorney's fees. In a significant amendment to Sec-
tion 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code, Con-
gress clarified that federal courts have the discretion to 
award attorney ' s fees to successful litigants under Title 
IX. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 
1976 authOlizes federal courts to award attorney's fees 
to the prevailing party in a Title IX case. The amount of 
attorney's fees can be a substantial cost to an unsuccessful 
litigant. 32 
When Title IX Applies 
Admission and Scholarship Policies 
Title IX prohibits educational institutions that re-
ceive federal funding from discriminating on the basis 
of sex in the admission of candidates to their programs. 
This prohibition applies to admission policies in institu-
tions of vocational education, professional education, 
graduate higher education, and undergraduate higher 
education.33 
Admission issues rarely arise in public elementary 
and secondalY schools. Occasionally vocational education 
programs involve admission decisions. Under Title IX, if 
an institution receives any federal financial assistance, its 
vocational education programs cannot treat applicants for 
admission differently on the basis of actual or potential 
parental, family, or mal'ital status, or pregnancy, child-
buth, termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom.34 
For example, if a pregnant student applies for admission 
31. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, _ U.S. _ , III 
S. Ct. 949 (1990). 
32. Attorney's fees awards have reached six figures in some cases. 
Ellen J. Vargyas , attomey, National Women 's Law Center, conversation with 
author, 26 February 1991. 
33 . 20 U.S.c. § 1681(a)(I). 
34. 34 C.P.R. § 106.21(c)(I) and (2) (1989). 
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to a vocational course in welding, school officials cannot 
prevent her entry in the program because of her sex or her 
pregnancy. They can require her to obtain a medical cer-
tification that she is physically able to participate in the 
course, so long as such a certification is requu'ed of all stu-
dents who have other physical conditions requu'ing the 
attention of a physician.35 
In a similar area in the public schools, a New York 
court intervened in the use of test scores to award schol-
arships when high school students alleged sex 
discrimination in the decision-making process. In 1989 
applicants for the New York State Regents and Empire 
scholarships successfully sued the New York Education 
Department concerning the method of determining the 
winners of these scholarships?6 The female students 
claimed that the depmtment discriminated against them 
under Title IX when it allowed the SAT score to be used 
as the sole determination of qualification for the scholar-
ships. It was undisputed that the female high school se-
niors scored an average of sixty points lower on the SAT 
tests than their male counterpmts, even though they per-
formed as well or better in high school courses. Defend-
ants' reliance on the SAT as the sole criterion resulted in 
a consistent pattern: females received only 43 percent and 
28 percent of the Regents and Empire State scholarships, 
respectively, although they represented 53 percent of the 
applicant pool. 
In the year before the lawsuit, the New York legis-
lature had ordered the department to find a better indica-
tion of high school achievement than the SAT scores. In 
response the depmtment had weighted the SAT scores and 
the grade point averages of the students equally. This for-
mula had improved the balance of females in relation to 
males: females who had comprised 53.3 percent of the 
applicant pool had received 49.3 percent and 37.4 percent 
of the Regents and Empire State scholarships, respec-
tively, that year. At the time of the lawsuit, the depaltment 
had decided to revert to its earlier method of exclusive re-
liance on the SAT scores.37 
The federal court granted a preliminary injunction 
after it concluded that the depmtment's sole reliance on 
SAT scores denied the plaintiffs equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and violated Title IX. The 
COUlt prohibited the department from relying exclusively 
on the SAT scores in the awm'd of Regents and Empu'e 
State scholarships. 
35. 34 C.P.R. § I 06.40(b) (1989). 
36. Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Educ. Dept. , 709 F. Supp. 
345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
37. Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Educ. Dept., 127 P.R.D. 
84, 86- 87 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1989). 
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Participation in Education Programs 
Including Physical Education and Human 
Sexuality Classes 
Schools covered by Title IX cannot exclude any stu-
dent from any academic, extracurricular, research, occu-
pational training, or other education program or activity 
on the basis of sex.38 For example, schools cannot offer 
separate classes for boys and girls in health, physical 
education, business, industrial arts, home economics, or 
music.39 
Title IX regulations provide for two exceptions to the 
rule prohibiting separate classes. Schools may separate 
students in elementary and secondary schools by sex 
when the class deals exclusively with human sexuality. 
Music teachers may also make requirements based on 
vocal range or quality that may result in a chorus of one 
or predominantly one sex. 
Although physical education classes cannot be sepa-
rated by sex, students may be divided into different 
classes or grouped into separate groups within a class if 
they are assessed by objective standards of individual 
ability and perfonuance developed and applied without 
regard to sex. However, physical education teachers can-
not use a single standard of measuring skill or progress 
that has an adverse effect on members of one sex. Instead, 
they must use appropriate standards that do not have such 
an effect. Finally, Title IX penuits the division of physi- -
cal education classes by sex when the activity involves 
bodily contact, such as wrestling, boxing, rugby, ice 
hockey, football, and basketball.40 
Counseling 
Under Title IX school officials cam10t discriminate 
against any person on the basis of sex in the provision of 
counseling or guidance services. Guidance counselors 
may not use different materials for male and female stu-
dents unless the materials cover the same occupations and 
the use of the different materials is shown to be essential 
to limit sex bias. School officials should be alelt to ways 
in which counselors may unintentionally encourage a stu-
dent to pursue a sex-stereotyped career or course plan, 
when other choices would be more appropriate for the stu-
dent. For example, male students should not be the only 
ones who receive infonuation on military careers while 
only females receive infonuation on careers in nursing. 
In addition school officials should be on the lookout 
for courses in which there is a dispropOltionate em-ollment 
38.34 C.F.R. § 106.31 ( 1989). 
39. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (1989). 
40. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b) tlu'Ough (f) (1989). 
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of students of one sex. If they find such a situation, they 
are required under Title IX to determine if the predomi-
nance of one sex in the course is the result of 
discrin1ination on the basis of sex in the counseling of stu-
dents or the career interest materials used by counselors, 
and if so, to take corrective action.41 For instance, if a 
school official discovers that only males are taking shop, 
while only females are taking home economics, the offi-
cial should talk with the school counselors and teachers 
to see if they are encouraging students of one sex to pur-
sue a particular course plan, while discouraging students 
of the otl1er sex in a similar pursuit. If the official finds 
that the counselors or teachers are in fact responsible for 
the dispropOltionate balance in the sexual enrollment in 
these courses, he or she is required to take corrective 
action. 
Competitive Athletics 
Title IX has had a dramatic impact on the paJticipa-
tion of girls in high school athletics. In 1971 only 7.4 per-
cent of high school interscholastic athletes were girls. Title 
IX went into effect in 1972, and the following year the 
paJticipation rate of female athletes rose by more than half 
a million nationwide. By the 1989-90 school year, the 
paJticipation rate of girls in high school athletics had risen 
to 35 percent.42 In 1971 North Carolina offered high 
school state championships to girls in only two sports, 
golf and tem1is, while today girls compete for state hon-
ors in ten sports.43 Despite this marked improvement, 
many girls still do not have the athletic opportunities that 
boys have. Some girls have pursued litigation to remedy 
the situation. 
Three different strains of litigation have developed 
as courts have attempted to resolve issues of sex dis-
crimination in athletics. Some litigants have sought relief 
under Title IX.44 Other litigants have focused on state 
equal lights statutes or constitutional amendments as the 
basis of their causes of action.45 A third group of litigants 
has claimed that educational institutions have denied them 
41. 34 C.F.R. § 106.36(a) through (c) (1989). 
42. Statistics compiled by the National Federation of State High 
School Associations, 1990 Handbook (Kansas City, Mo.: NFSHSA, 1990), 
73. 
43. Thomas H. Thornburg, "The Validity of Single Sex and Coed, In-
terscholastic Sports Teams," School Law Bulletin 21 (Spring 1990): II , here-
inafter cited as Thornburg, "Sports Teams"); N.C. High School Athletic 
Association, 1988-89 Handbook (Chapel Hill, N.C.: NCHSAA, 1988), 12. 
44. Croteau v. Fair, 686 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1988); Rowley by 
Rowley v. Board of Educ. of St. Vrain Valley School Dist. RE-lJ, 863 F.2d 
39 (10th Cir. 1988). 
45. B.C. v. Board of Educ., 220 N.J. Super. 214, 531 A.2d 1059 
(1987); Commonwealth ex rei. Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Ass'n, 
18 Pa. Coml11w. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975). 
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their state or federal constitutional rights to equal protec-
tion of the laws in the administration of athletic pro-
grams.46 Because some litigants have sought relief under 
more than one cause of action, the following discussion 
is divided into topics according to the description of the 
litigant and not the cause of action used by the litigant. 
The Title IX litigation relies on Title IX's prohibi-
tion on recipients of federal assistance from discriminat-
ing on the basis of sex in any interscholastic, 
intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics offered by an 
educational institution. According to the Title IX regula-
tions, no recipient of federal assistance may provide ath-
letics separately according to the sex of the paIticipants, 
or exclude members of one sex from paIticipating in ath-
letics.47 There are two huge exceptions to Title IX's pro-
hibition on separate teams for males aIld females: if the 
selection for the separate teams is based upon competitive 
skill or if the activity is a contact sport. 
Selection based on competitive skill. Title IX pro-
vides that an educational institution may operate or spon-
sor a teru.n in a particulaI' sport for members of one sex if 
the selection is based on competitive skill. Because almost 
all athletic teams aI'e chosen based on competitive skill, 
this exception to the lUle prohibiting separation of teams 
by sex covers a large portion of athletics. However, the 
regulations provide that if there is not a team available for 
members of the opposite sex, and athletic oppOltunities for 
members of that sex have been limited previously, thew 
members of the excluded sex must be allowed to tryout 
for the team unless the sport involved is a contact sport.48 
For instance, if the school has a golf teaIn for men but no 
golf team for women, then women must be pelmitted the 
opportunity to tryout for the men's golf team. 
Comparable teamfor female athletes does not exist. 
Since the enactment of Title IX, federal and state comts 
have been viltually unanimous in upholding the regula-
tion allowing women to tryout for men ' s noncontact 
sports teams when there are no comparable teams for 
women.49 Neither Title IX nor the courts that have 
46. Croteau v. Fair, 686 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Va. 1988); Rowley v. 
Board of Educ. of S!. Vrain Valley School Dis!. RE-lJ, 863 F.2d 39 ( 10th 
Cir. 1988); B.C. v. Board of Educ., 220 N.J . Super. 214, 531 A.2d 1059 
(1 987); Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 11 26 (9th Cir. 
1982); Ritacco v. Norwin School Dis!., 36 1 F. Supp. 930 (W.O. Pa. 1973). 
47. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 I(a) (1989). 
48.34 C. F.R. § 106.41 (b) (1989). See the section in this article on 
contact sports. 
49. Thornburg, "Sports Teams." See also Bednar v. Nebraska School 
Activities Ass' n, 531 F.2d 922 (8 th CiI. 1976) (cross-country running); 
Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (cross-
country rUlming ,md skiing); Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 
1207 (6th Cir. 1973) (tennis); Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 
259 Ind. 515 , 289 N.E.2d 494 (1972) (golf); Hoover v. Meiklejohn , 430 F. 
Supp. 164 CD. Colo. 1977) (soccer) . 
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considered the issue have mandated that women be per-
mitted to play on these teams. Instead, their right is lim-
ited to the 0PPOItunity to tryout. If they make the team, 
of course, they then have the right to be on the team. 
In 1988 a Virginia federal distlict court ruled that 
Julie Croteau, a seventeen-year-old high school senior, 
had not been discriminated against when she was "cut" 
after the second tryout for the men's baseball team. The 
court concluded that she had failed to prove that the de-
cision to cut her from the vaI'sity baseball teru.n was mo-
tivated by gender bias. Rather, the court concluded that 
she had received a fair tryout and the coach's decision to 
cut her was made in good faith. The comt explained its 
decision: 
[T]he law 's mandate of equality does not dictate a dis-
regard of the differences in talents and abilities among 
individuals. As the Court noted from the bench, there is 
no constitutional or statutory right to play any position 
on any athletic team. Instead, there is only the right to 
compete fo r such a position on equal tenns and to be free 
from sex di scrimination in state action.50 
Sometimes OCR has gone fmther than requiring an 
educational institution to permit a female student to try out 
for the male team. The HEW Intercollegiate Athletics 
Policy Interpretation issued in 1979 fmther requires that 
in celtain situations involving noncontact sports an edu-
cational institution must sponsor a team for members of 
the excluded sex. For instance, if the school has a golf 
teru.n for males but no golf team for females, a school will 
be required to sponsor a golf teru.n for females if the fol-
lowing circumstances exist: 
1. The opportunities for members of the excluded sex 
have historically been limited; 
2. There is sufficient interest and ability among the 
members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team 
and a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate com-
petition fo r that team; and 
3. Members of the excluded sex do not possess sufficient 
skill to be selected for a single integrated team, or to 
compete actively on such a team if selected.51 
Although this Policy Interpretation was designed specifi-
cally for intercollegiate athletics, "its general principles 
will often apply to club, intramural, and interscholastic 
athletic programs, which aI'e also covered by regulation."52 
Comparable team for male athletes does not exist. 
When male students have sued seeking the right to tryout 
and play for a women 's team, most courts have ruled that 
male students do not have a right to paIticipate on the 
50. Croteau v. Fair, 686 F. Supp. 552, 554 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
51. Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Interpretation, issued December 
11,1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 7141 3, 7141 8. 
52. ld. at 71413. 
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women's team.53 Although this result appears contradic-
tory to that achieved by women when they have sued, 
courts have justified excluding men from women's teams 
for two major reasons: First, courts have 1U1ed that histori-
cally women have been excluded from participation in 
SPOltS, while men have had and continue to have ample 
opportunity to participate in athletic activities. COUltS have 
reasoned that if men are permitted to join women's teams, 
they will be taking the positions from women, thereby fur-
ther reducing the opportunity of women to participate in 
sports. Second, men are often taller and stronger and 
therefore, if allowed to pmticipate, may soon dominate the 
women's teams. 
Courts that have applied Title IX to situations in 
which a male wishes to play on a female athletic team 
have arrived at differing interpretations of the Depmtment 
of Education's regulation requiring a school to determine 
if the "athletic opportunities for members of that sex have 
previously been limited."54 Most COUtts have looked to the 
overall athletic opportunities for members of the excluded 
sex at that pmticular schooJ.55 For instance, a New York 
COUlt determined that if the overall athletic opportunities 
for males were equal to or better than those of females at 
the school in question, then males could be excluded from 
a particular team without violating Title IX.56 
Comparable team for female athletes does exist. Oc-
casionally outstanding female athletes have sued to join 
male teams so that they cm1 have a higher level of com--
petition. COutts have generally rejected these claims when 
there is already a female team in existence.57 
Under Title IX regulations schools must petmit fe-
males to try out for male teams only when there m'e no 
female temns, and then only when it is a noncontact SpOlt 
and there has been a past history of discrimination in 
athletic opportunities for women. 58 Even though they do 
not have a claim under Title IX, students may still sue 
under other legal theories. For instance, they may allege 
53. Thomburg, "Sports Teams." See also Rowley v. Bomd of Educ. 
of St. Vrain Valley, 863 F.2d 39 (10th CiJ. 1989); B.C. v. Board of Educ., 
220 N.J. Super. 214, 531 A.2d 1059 (1987); Clark v. Arizona Interscholas-
tic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982), cuI. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); 
Petrie v. Illinois High School Athletic Ass'n, 75 III. App. 3d 980, 394 N.E.2d 
855 (1979); and Muladaradelis v. Haldane Central School Bd., 74 A.D.2d 
248,427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980). 
54.34 C.F.R. § 106.4I(b) (1989). 
55. Thornburg, "Sports Teams." See also Forte 'y. North Babylon 
Union Free School Dist. , 105 Misc. 2d 36, 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
Special Term, 1980); and Muladaradelis v. Haldane Central School Bd., 74 
A.D.2d 248, 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980). 
56. Muladaradelis v. Haldane Central School Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1980). 
57. Thornburg, "Sports Teams." 
58.34 c.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1989). 
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violations of equal protection or a violation of a state's 
equal rights act. 
Contact sports. The Department of Education regu-
lations issued under Title IX exempt schools from provid-
ing coeducational tean1S for contact sports. The regulations 
define contact sports as including "boxing, wrestling, 
rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other SPOltS the 
purpose of major activity of which involves bodily con-
tact."59 The HEW Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Inter-
pretation provides that if a higher educational institution 
sponsors a temn for members of one sex in a contact sport, 
it must do so for members of the other sex under the fol-
lowing circumstances: 
1. The oppOltunities for members of the excluded 
sex have historically been limited. 
2. There is sufficient interest and ability among 
the members of the excluded sex to sustain a vi-
able temn and a reasonable expectation of inter-
collegiate competition for that team.6() 
Comparable team for female athletes does not exist. 
Despite these regulations and policies, since the mid-
1970s women have consistently won the right to compete 
on men ' s teams in contact sports when there are no 
women's teams available to them. Instead of limiting their 
legal theories to Title IX, they have alleged a violation of 
a state equal rights act or a violation of the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection under the law. Women have 
succeeded in winning the right to compete on men's con-
tact sports teams when there were no women's teams in 
wrestling, football, and soccer and in Massachusetts, in all 
contact sportS.61 
For example, a federal dishict court in Nebraska in-
validated a mle that prohibited females from joining a 
male wrestling team when there were no female teams.62 
The COUlt condemned a mle that pennitted males regard-
less of body size, sh'ength level, speed capability, or 
muscle power output to tryout for the temn, but prohib-
ited all females. The court rejected "[s]uch a paternalistic 
gender-based classification" that results from ascribing a 
particulm' trait or quality to one sex, when not all share 
59.ld. 
60. Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Interpretation, issued December 
11,1979,44 Fed. Reg. 71418. 
61. Thornburg, "Sports Teams," at 13; Saint v. Nebraska School Ac-
tivities Ass 'n, 684 F. Supp. 626 (D. Neb. 1988) (wrestling); Lantz v. 
Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (football); Force v. Pierce City 
R-VI School Dist. , 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.Mo. 1983) (football); Hoover 
v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) (soccer); Balsley v. North 
Hunterdon Regional High School Bd. of Educ. , 225 N.J. 221, 542 A.2d 29 
(1988) (football); Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 
347 Mass. 836,371 N.E.2d 426 (1977) (all sports). 
62. Saint v. Nebraska School Activities Ass 'n, 684 F. Sllpp. 626 (D. 
Neb. 1988). 
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that trait or quality. The court concluded that such a re-
sult is not only inherently unfair, but generally tends only 
to perpetuate stereotypical notions regarding the proper 
roles of men and women and results in a denial of equal 
protection of the laws for all women to whom the rule 
applies.63 
Comparable team for f emale athletes does exist. A 
federal circuit court of appeals and one Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court reached a different result 
when the female requesting the right to play on a male 
contact sport team already had the opportunity to play on 
a female team.64 In 1981 the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected an Illinois girl 's petition to overturn a 
rule that prevented her from playing on her junior-high 
boys ' basketball team. When Karen O'Comlor emolled in 
the sixth grade, she was told that she could only play on 
the girls' basketball team. When the district court first 
heard the case, it concluded that the boys ' and girls' teams 
were not equal, because the girls' team did not give her 
the opportunity to compete with those who were equal or 
superior to her in skil1.65 The school officials appealed. 
The school officials won before the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Karen O'Connor then sought a tempo-
rary delay of the tryouts until her case could be argued 
before the United States Supreme Court. Justice Stevens, 
sitting as a single judge, ruled against Karen on her mo-
tion for a delay of the tryouts. He found the rule prohib-
iting girls from competing against boys in contact sports 
to be rational. 
Without a gender-based class ification in competitive 
contact sports, there would be a substantial risk that boys 
would dominate the girls' programs and deny them an 
equal opportunity to compete in interscholastic events. 
The defendants' program appears to have been adopted 
in full compliance with the regulations promulgated by 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Al-
though such compliance certainly does not cOIner immu-
nity on the defendants, it does indicate a strong 
probability that the gender-based classi fication can be 
adequately justifiedY' 
Because the case was never argued before the full 
United States Supreme Court, it is unclear how the Court 
would rule when confronted with a case in which a female 
sought to playa contact sport on a male team when a fe-
male team already existed. 
63. Id. at 629. 
64. O'Connor v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. 23, 645 F.2d 578 (7th 
Cir. 198 1), on application to vacate stay, 449 U.S. 130 1 (S tevens, Circuit 
Justice, 1980), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 ( 1982), on remand, 545 F. Supp. 
376 (N.D. III. 1982). 
65. O'Connor v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. 23, 545 F. Supp. 376 
(N.D. 1II. 1982). 
66. O'Connor v. Bmu-d of Ecl uc. of School Dist. 23, on application 
to vacate stay, 449 U.S. 1301 , 1307 (Stevens, Circuit Justice, 1980). 
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Equal athletic opportunity. When it published 
regulations to govern the administration of Title IX, the 
Depattment of Education mandated that all recipients of 
federal education assistance provide "equal athletic oppor-
tunity" for members of both sexes if the recipient oper-
ates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or 
intramural athletics. Although the regulations do not de-
fine "equal athletic opportunity," they do provide a list of 
factors the director of the Office of Civil Rights may con-
sider when detennining if an institution is complying with 
the equal OPPOltunity mandate: 
1. Whether the selection of sports and levels of 
competition effectively accommodate the inter-
ests and abilities of members of both sexes 
2. The provision of equipment and supplies 
3. Scheduling of games and practice time 
4. Travel and per diem allowance 
5. Opportunity to receive coaching and academic 
tutoring 
6. Assignment and compensation of coaches and 
tutors 
7. Provision of locker rooms and practice and 
competitive facilities 
8. Provision of medical and training facilities and 
services 
9. Provision of housing and dining facilities and 
serVIces 
10. Publicity67 
According to the regulations, the above list is not 
exhaustive. In addition the regulations provide that un-
equal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or 
for male and female teams do not constitute a violation 
of the regulations automatically, but the director of the Of-
fi ce of Civil Rights may consider the failure to provide 
necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equal-
ity of opportunity for members of each sex. Under the 
1979 HEW Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidelines, 
the Depattment of Education will assess compliance with 
both the recruitment and the general athletic program re-
quirements of the regulation by comparing the availabil-
ity, quality , and kinds of benefits, opportunities, and 
treatment afforded members of both sexes. "Institutions 
will be in compliance if the compared program compo-
nents are equivalent, that is, equal or equal in effect. Un-
der this standard, identical benefits, opportunities, or 
treatment at'e not required, provided the overall effect of 
any differences is negligible."68 
In a lengthy opinion a federal dish'ict court in Pennsyl-
vania analyzed the athletic program at Temple University 
67 . 34 C.P.R. § 106.4 1(c) (1989). 
68. Intercollegiate Athletics Po licy Interpretation , issued December 
11 , 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 71413 , 71415. 
r Spring 1991 
in light of the opportunities available to men and women 
students.69 Women students had sued claiming that al-
though the school offered both male and female teams, the 
women were discriminated against because the programs 
and the money expended on the women's athletic teams 
were not equal to that expended for the male teams. The 
students alleged that the separate programs were unequal 
in almost every conceivable area including opportunities 
to compete, expenditures, recruiting, coaching, travel and 
per diem allowances, uniforms, equipment, supplies, train-
ing facilities, academic tutoring, and publicity. The stu-
dents claimed that they were being discriminated against 
under Title IX in the unequal financial aid provided to 
male and female athletes, and that they were discriminated 
against under the equal protection clause of the United 
States Constitution because of the unequal expenditures 
for the male and female teams. 
After a hearing on motions for summary judgment 
(asking the court to issue a ruling without a trial), the comt 
concluded that although Temple University was not obli-
gated to sponsor an intercollegiate athletic program, if it 
chose to do so, then the program "must be made available 
to all on equal telms. "70 The court found that the women 
had raised legitimate claims that they could present at hial 
concerning the number of teams available for men versus 
the number of teams available for women, and the expend-
iture of approximately $2,100 more per male student ath-
lete than per female student athlete. 
The North Carolina appellate courts have not de-
cided any cases that interpret these regulations. In addi-
tion the Fourth Circuit Comt of Appeals and the United 
States Supreme Court have not decided any cases defin-
ing the meaning of "equal athletic opportunity" in the De-
pmtment of Education 's regulations concerning Title IX. 
Sexual Harassment and 
Title IX 
Public elementary and secondary school officials 
should be awm'e that in recent yem's courts have begun to 
recognize sexual harassment as a valid legal claim. As 
early as 1977 a federal district court found that sexual ha-
rassment was a valid legal claim under Title IX.71 In 1986 
The United States Supreme Court first addressed sexual 
hm'assment in the workplace in Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson.72 In that case a bank teller sued her employer 
charging that she had been subjected to a sexually hostile 
69. Hafer v. Temple University , 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D.Pa. 1987). 
70. Id. at 525. 
7 1. Alexander v. Yale, 459 F. Supp. I (D. COlli. 1977), affd, 63 1 F.2d 
178 (2d Cir. 1980). 
72. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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work environment because of the unwelcome advances of 
a vice-president and bank manager. She testified that 
she had been fondled in front of other employees and that 
she had been forcibly raped. Because of her fear of los-
ing her job, she said she had succumbed to her boss's un-
welcome advances, The United States Supreme Court 
upheld the Health and Human Services regulation that 
'" [u ]nwelcome sexual advances ... and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature . . . [constitute] sexual 
harassment ... [when] such conduct has the purpose or 
effect of umeasonably interfering with an individual's 
work peIiOlmance or creating an intimidating, hostile or 
offensive working environment. ' "73 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not 
yet decided a case of sexual harassment under Title IX, 
lower courts have found that sexual harassment is a vio-
lation of Title IX. In Alexander v. Yale74 a lower comt tn-st 
recognized sexual harassment as a valid claim under Title 
IX. In that case women students joined former students 
and faculty members in seeking a court order requiring 
Yale University to implement a mechanism for process-
ing sexual harassment complaints. 
In a more recent case the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals followed the Supreme COUlt 'S reasoning in Meritor 
and concluded, "in a Title IX case, an educational insti-
tution is liable upon a finding of hostile environment 
sexual hm'assment perpetrated by its supervisors upon em-
ployees if an official representing that institution knew, or 
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, of 
the hm'assment's occurrence, unless that official can show 
that he or she took appropriate steps to halt it."75 
According to the National Coalition for Women and 
Girls in Education, there m'e two basic types of sexual ha-
rassment. Both types violate Title IX. 
The first type is characterized by the imposition of un, 
welcome sexual activity in a relationship of unequal 
power. Examples of this type of harassment include un-
welcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when 
(1) submission to or rejection of such conduct is made 
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of in-
struction, employment, or participation in an educational 
activity or (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct 
by an individual is used as a bas is for evaluation in mak-
ing academic or personnel decisions affecting an indi-
vidual. The second type of harassment occurs where 
harassment creates a hostile, intimidating, or offensive 
73 . Id. at 65 [citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604. II (a)(3) (1988)] . 
74. 459 F. Supp. I (D. Conn. 1977), off d, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 
1980). See also Elaine D. Ingulli , "Sexual Hm'assment in Education," Rutgers 
Law Journal 18 (1987): 28 1; and Carolyn Elli s Staton, "Sex Discrimination 
in Public Education ," Mississippi Law Journal 58 (1988): 323. 
75. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 88 1, 901 (1st Cir. 
1988). 
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academic or work environment and those in a position 
of authority do not redress the problem. 76 
The Office of Civil Rights found a violation of Title 
IX when a high school coach and economics teacher be-
came involved in a sexual relationship with one of his fe-
male students. The school's principal was informed of the 
relationship and discouraged the student from pursuing 
the matter. At the end of the school year the principal 
retired and the coach resigned. The Office of Civil Rights 
investigated the case and found a Title IX violation. It 
closed its investigation after it received assurances that 
76. National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education, Title IX: 
A Practical Guide 10 Achieving Sex Equity in Education (Washington , D.C. : 
NCWGE, 1988), II. 
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actions had been taken to prevent any future violations of 
Title IX.77 
Conclusion 
It is clear that Title IX can affect many areas of pub-
lic elementary and secondary schools: athletics, physi-
cal education and other special classes, counseling, 
admissions, and others. Because Title IX applies to all 
North Carolina public schools, officials must be careful 
to avoid sex discrimination in any school programs or 
policies .• 
77. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 911 F.2ci 617 (11 th 
Cir. 1990). 
